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This paper considers an economy where labor is indivifible and agents are identical  Although the 
discontinuity  in labor supply at the individual  leve! disappears  as a  result of aggregation, it is 
shown that indivisible labor has strong  consequences for the aggregate behavior of ~he economy. It 
is also shown that optimal  allocations involve lotteries over employmem and cor~umption. 
Io  ln~ 
During the last decade general equilibrium  theory has become an increas- 
ingly  common  framework  in  which  to  study  the  aggregate  properties  ef 
economies [see,  e.g.,  Lucas (1981)].  In its original form [see Debreu (1959)] 
general equilibrium theory was developed in the context of convex economic 
envirok~ments,  but has since been extended to non-convex environments [see 
Aumann (1966) and Mas-ColcU (1977)]. The concern of these authors was the 
existence of equilibrium.  They show that if there is a  continuum of agents, 
then equilibrium exists even with non-convexities at the individual level. Their 
analysis left unanswered the question of whether or not these non-convexities 
had an important effect on the nature of equilibrium. The conclusion of this 
paper is that they may have majer implications for the aggregrate r~;ponse of 
an  economy  to  shocks.  This  claim  is  demonstrated  in  the  context  of an 
economy in which labor supply is indivisible.  In particular it is shown that 
such an economy composed of identical agents behaves a~ if populated by a 
s~t~gle agent whose preferences do not match the prefereno~ of any individual 
in the economy. Furthermore the economy will display much larger fluctua- 
tions in hours of work in response to a given shock to technology. 
The analysis also shows ;hat attaining optimal allocations in such economie~ 
mey  involve  holding lotteries  over employment to determine  which agents 
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supply  labor.  It  is  demonstrated  how  these  lotteries  may  be  decentralized 
through  markets  and  how  the  use  of  lotteries  facilitates  computation  of 
equilibria.  Prescott  and  Townsend  (1984, t985)  found  similar  properties  in 
economies with private information. 
Although  this paper only considers  the case of indivisible labor, there are 
many other  situations of practical importance where similar non-convexities 
may  play  an  important  role.  Markets  for durables  such  as  houses  or  cars 
involve  an  element  of  indivisibility  that  may  p~ay  an  important  role  in 
understanding aggregate fluctuations in the~ ma~k, is. Decisions about mobil- 
ity, marriage, fertility and occupational choice also involve a  choice which is 
e~sc,~'.iaiiy  a  zero-one  choice,  and  hence,  the  same types of considerations 
studied  in this paper will be of interest in analysing those problems. Becker 
(1995) shows how human car~ital accumulation may lead to non-convexities. 
2.  ~  emimnment E 
In this and the next three sections the problem to be studied is considered in 
its simplest form. 
The economy consists of a con  "tinuum of identical agents with names in_ the 
interval  [0,1].  There  are  three  commodities:  labor,  capital  and  omput  (al- 
though, as will become clear later, capital only serves the role of allowing for a 
constant  returns  to  scale  technology  together  with  a  diminishing  marginal 
product of labor). All activity takes place in a single time period. Capital (K) 
and labor (N) are used to produce output according to the concave constant 
returns to scale technology f(K, N), which is assumed to be strictly increasing 
and  twice continuously differentiable in both arguments with fn(K, N) and 
f22(K, N) strictly negative. 
Each agent (or worker) is endowed with one unit of time and one unit cf 
capital. Time is indivisible: either the entire unit is supplied as labor or none 
of  it  is  supplied  as  labor.  All  workers  have  an  identical  utility  function 
specified by 
u(c) -  v(n), 
where  c >_ 0  is consumption and  n ~  {0,1}  is supply of lal,c-.  It is assumed 
that  u  is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave. If 
labor  were  perfectly  divisible  it  would  be  natural  to  assume  that  ,fin)  is 
convex, increasing and twice continuously differentiable. With labor assumed 
to be indivisible, the only values of J,(n) that matter are u(0) and  p(1). It is 
assumed that  p(0)--0 and  p(1)= m, where m  is a  strictly positive constant. 
For future reference it will be useful to define the consumption set X for each 
worker. According to the above specification, 
X= {(c,n,k)eR3: c>O, nE {0,1},  OKk_<l}. R. Rogerson, Indivisible labor, lotteries arm equilibrium  5 
It is ot' particular interest that the set X is non-convex. The above de~ription 
will be referred to as the economy E. 
3.  Equilibrium and optimality in E 
This section presents the standard notio~ of competitive equilibrium  for E 
and displays some anomalies. First we deO~e an allocation. 
Definition.  An allocation for E  i~ a list tc~tz,"  " ~  ~.(t),  k(t),  K,N), where for 
each t~  [0,1], (c(t), n(t), k(t))~X  and K,N>_O. 
Definition.  A  competitive  equilibrium  for  E  is  a  list  (c(t),  n(t),  k(t), 
K, N, w, r) such that: 
(i)  For each t ~ [0,1], (c(t), n(t), k(t)) is a solution to 
max  - 
C. II.k 
subject to 
c<_nw+rk,  c>_O, n~{O,1}, 
(ii)  N  and  K  are a solution to 







K = folk(t) dt, 
£I 
N = Jc n(t)dt, 
f( K, N) = folC(t)dt. 
The above &fi~tion is standard.  Conditions (i)--(iii)  are, respectively, utility 
maximizatior, )rofit maximization and market cleating. 
It is possible  to show that a competitive equilibrium exists for E, however 
this  is not ee~..tal  to the discussion Lere.  The interesting  featt're of E  that 6  R. Rogerson, Indivisibt.e labor, lotteries and equilibrium 
distinguishes it from p~rely neoclassical economies is the indivisibility in labor 
supply. One of the impi~ications of this feature is that it is possible for identical 
agents  to  receive  different  aflocations  in  equitib~um.  If consumption  and 
technology  sets  are  convex  and  preferences  are  s~fictly  convex,  then  in 
equilibrium  identical  agents  always receive identical  allocations.  This result 
follows  from the fact that budget  sets are convex and  hence  if two distinct 
points each in the budget set give equal utilities then there necessarily exists a 
third  point also in  the bu,~get  set providing a  greater level of utility.  In the 
economy E  being considered here the consumption set  X  is not convex and 
hence this argument no longer holds. A~ the fol!ow;mg example demonstrates, 
neither does the result that identicaJ agents receive identical bundles. 
Example I.  Consider the following specification for E" 
f(g,  N) = K~NI-%  a = 0.5. 
u(c) =  lnC, 
m =  !n 2.5. 
The  only  variable  to  be  solved  for  is  N:  all  capital  will  necessadly  be 
suppiied,  the  consump~on  of thc=:  supplying labor ~_!1 be (w + r)  and  of 
those not supplying labor it w;dl be r; also, w is the MP 7. and r  is the MPK. 
All  workers  must  receive  the  same  utility  even  if  they  receive  different 
allocations.  So solving the following equation will determine the equilibrium: 
u( MPL + MPK ) -  m = u( MPK ), 
which,  if K =  1, is simply an equation in  N. For the given functional  forms 
ttns becomes 
In [~N'-~  +  (I -- .)N-"]  -  m =  In [~N ~  % 
SoMng this equation gives 
1-a  1 
N  =  -- 
a  e  m-  1  " 
The equilibrium for the above specification is 
(c(t), n(t),  k(t))= (1.1067972,1,1), 
-- (0.3162278, 0,1), 
(,,, r ) -- (0.7905694, 0.3162278). 
t E  [0,0.4], 
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One of the surprising features of this equilibrium is that identical agents are 
receiving  different  allocations.  Another  sm~prising  featme  is  that  there  are 
ai:ocations which Pareto-dominate the above allocation. In particular, c~asider 
the following allocation ruie.  Give every individual a consurlption of 
c = 0.6324555, 
(which is the average ~nsumption in the pre:vAous  example) but hold a lottery 
to  randomly choose a  fraction 0.4 of workers  to supply iabor.  The  utility 
obtained by an individual in the equiiibrium allocation ;.s given by 
V = 0.5623413, 
whereas the expected utility of the alternative allocation described above is 
V= 0.5993895. 
At  firs t  .  this  result  seems  to be  troubling.  As commonly stated [see,  e.g., 
Debreu (1959,ch. 6)] the first welfare theorem applies to the economy E. The 
solution to "his apparent logical inconsistency is that the alternative allocation 
describe~ ~t-~, e c.ioes not belong to the set X and hence is outside the scope of 
the set (:t =!~t~.~,tions considered by the first welfare theorem. Recall that the 
standard r;:~ethod of proof for the first welfare theorem involves an argument 
that  if individuals prefer an allocation to their individual  allocation then it 
:l~,st cost too much relative to their budget or else they would have purchased 
it.  ~  argument does not hold here because the allocation involving lotteries 
is  not  viewed  as  a  feasible  one  by  consumers  with  consumption  set  X. 
However, the result is still troubling because it suggests that not all ~ains **0 
:fade are being realized eve~ though apparently all markets are in operation. 
1~  :]:,e remainder of this paper it is shown how the consumption set X can be 
r-odified so that allocations like the one described above can be obtained as a 
~mpetitive allocation. 
4.  Equilibrium with lotteries 
In this section the consumptio~ set i~ ~xpca~,cd  ~:: introducing a  spe6_~c 
class of lotteries. All objects will remain the same except for the consumptien 
sets and preferenc.es.  Define: 
Xl= {(¢. r/, k)~ X: n=l}, 
((c,.,  x: n=0}, 8  R. Rogerso~,  [ndi,isible labor, lotteries and eq~dtibriwn 
will be the new consumption set lcr the workers. The set  -¥1  represents 
allocations where the individual is supplying labor and the set  X  2 represents 
allocations where the individual is not supplying labor. Motivated by example 
one  and  the  discussion  that  followed,  it  is  desirable  to  allo".  workers  tc 
randomize the labor supply decision. Hence the third element, a n~Jmber in the 
interval  [0, t]  renresents  the  probability  that  the  X1  allocation  is  realized, 
whereas  one  minus  this  number is  the probabi!~ty that  theX z  allocation is 
realized.  Note  that  the  set  X  is  convex. An element  of  X  wi!i  be  written 
((ca,!~k:), (c>0, k2),  ~).  Preferences must be deemed ore,  this set and  the 
natural  extension  is  to compute the expected  utility of "Lhe lottery,,, i.e.,  the 
utility obtained from receMng the above allocation is 
9i,(c~) -  ",] + 0- -  9)[~(c;)]. 
The economy produced by making these changes will  De denoted by E  and 
a competitive equilibrium for E  is defined by: 
Defini~;on.  A  cGmpefitive  equilibrium  for  E  is  a  fist  tq(t),  kl(~),  c.2(t), 
k2(t ), ~(;),  K, N, w. r) such that: 
(i) For each t ~[0,1], (c~(t)  kt(t),  Q(t),  kz(~), cb(t)) is a solution to 
max  ~,[,,(c,;  .,1  +  (i-~[.(<)], 
%. t 2, kt, k2 • ~ 
subject  to 
,~< +  (1 -;,).._<  .,.~ +  ~[~-k~ +  (i -  ~)k:], 
c,_>0,  O_<_<k,_<!,  i=1,2, 
0_<~_<1. 
(ii) K  and  N  are a solution to 
max f( K, N ) -  rK -  wlv. 
K.N 
subject  to 
K>_O,  N>0. 
(iii) 
ot(  l! t,~  ¢!-A~t  '~  t.',~dt  ' 
:,: = fo~(¢(,)) at, 
f(,c, x) = ~'(9(0c1(t)  + (I -.~(0)c.(t~)d. R. Rogcrson, Indivisible labar, lotteri~ and ecltdlibri, um. 
Although  the  nature  of the  above  three  conditions  ix  standard  thee  is  a 
nob-standard dement imbedded in them. This arises because individuals are 
buying and selling commodities contingent upon the outcome of an individual 
specific lottery.  It is worthwhile to discuss possible institutional  descriptions 
c~rfesponding to the formal notion of equilib,ium described above. A descrip- 
tion of a  fully decentralized equilibrium is as foUows. The prices of output, 
labor, tnd capital are given by 1, w, and r, respectively. An individual chooses 
a  lottery  :¢here with probabflhy q~ they work and sut~ply k 1 units of capital 
and with- probability (1 -  ~) they don't work and supply k 2 units of capita/. 
Hence, with probability ~ they will receive income w + klr, and with probabil- 
ity (1 -  ~) they will receive income k2r. It is a:~sttmed that the individual can 
purchase insurance in the face of t~s income ~mcertainty.  In particular,  the 
individual  can  purchase  consump~cn  contingert  upon  the  outcome of the 
lottery. Assuming a zero profit condition for the firm offering this insurance 
implies that relative prices between the work gad don't work outcomes will be 
given by (,b/(1- ¢)).  Hence the budget con;',.raint is  simply given by that 
which appetcs in condition (i) of the definitior~. 
It is also worth noting that it is implicS".ly assumed that the wz.gc rate that 
an  individual  fac~  is  independent  of the probability ¢,  of working  that  is 
chosen. Tt~s occurs b~ause there is a continuum of agents and each individ- 
ual is choosing an individual specific random variable. Under these conditions 
a  given  agent's  decision  has  no  impact  on  the  distribution  of total  labor 
supplied.  In  particular  there  is  no  difference  betw~n  the  case  where  all 
-vorkers supply labor with probability one-half and  the case where half the 
workers supply labor with probab/iity one and the other half supply labor g4th 
probability zero. "tqds is not the case with a finite munber of woJkers: the two 
situations provide the same expected vz'_ue of labor supply but the variance is 
different.  In this case we might expect that the wage rate v-ill depend on the 
value of ¢  chosen. With a contil~uum of agents the above mentioned variance 
is always zeroJ 
Call  the  maximization  proble~n  in  condition  (i)  of equilibrium  problem 
0~-1). 
Lemma  L  If  (cl, c2, kl, k2, ep  )  is a  solution  to  (P-l)  and  ~  (0, i),  then 
C~  ~  C  2. 
Proaf.  The first-order conditions for this problem are 
ffu'(cl)--~O  and  (~-+)u'(c2)=(1-~)8, 
1  1"he case of a continuum of i.Ld. random  variables can cau,.e some prot,,ems. See Judd (1985) 
for a treatment of th/s problem. 10  R. Rogerson, Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium 
where 0 is the multiplier on the budget constra.int.  If ~  is not zero or one then 
the result follows immediately.  Ii 
Note that if e  e ~  (0,1), there is no harm in requiring that c 1 = c 2. We can 
al~o assume that k 1 -- k 2 = 1. Then problem (P-l) becomes 
(P-2)  maxu(c) -  era, 
c, ep 
subject to 
c=wep+r,  c>O,  0~1. 
Note that by the strict concavity of u(-) this problem has a unique solution. 
Since all agents are identical it  follows that  c  and  ~  are independent  of t. 
Hence, finding an equilibrium now reduces to finding a list (c, ¢, K, N, r, w) 
such that 
(i)  (c, 0) solves problem (P-2). 
(ii)  (K, N) solves profit maximization problem. 
(iii)  ep = N, K = I, c = F( K, N ). 
This is identical to the equilibrium one would ob  "tain for an economy wffh 
technology f(K, N), with one agent whose utility is specified by  u(c) -mn 
with consumption set 
X=, {(c,n,k)~R3:  c>_O,O<__n<__l,O<_k<_l}. 
This economy is entirely neoclassical; in particular it has no non-convexity. 
Define the problem 
(P-3) max u( c) -  toO, 
c,¢p 
subject to 
c_<f(1,¢),  c>__0,  0~¢~1. 
This is the social planning problem for E  which maximiTes  utility.  Because 
this economy now appears identical to one without any non-convexities, the 
standard results on eqm'valence of competitive and optimal allocations can be 
applied [see, e.g., Negishi (1960)]. 
Proposition I.  If (c*, ~*, K*, N*, w*, r*)  is a  competitive equilibrium for E, 
then ( c*, ~*) is the solution to problem (P-3). K  Rogerson, Indic;.sible labor, Io:teries and equifibrium  11 
Proposition  2.  If (c*,**)  is the solution to problem  (P-3),  then there exzsts 
K*,N*, w*,  and r* such  that  (c*, ~*, K*, N*, w*, r*)  is a  competitive equi- 
librium for E. 
Since (P-2:) is a strictly concave programming problem, the above two results 
imply the existence of a unique equilibrium. 
One of the reasons  for adding  lotteries  to the consumption set was the 
potential gain in welfare. In essence, making labor indix~sible creates a barrier 
to trade and the introduction of lotteries is one way to overcome pint of this 
barrier. It should be noted that adding lotteries of the type considered here to 
an environment similar to E  but without the indivisibility in labor wo,dd have 
no effect on equilibrium.  Finally, in Example I  it was demonstrated that an 
allocation involving lotteries Pareto-dominated the equilibrium alloc~tion for 
E. That this result is general should be clear, but a formal statement is: 
Proposition 3.  If (c*(t), n*(t), k*(t), K*, N*) is an equilibrium allocation for 
E  and (El(t),  kl(t),  ~2(t),  k2(t ), ok(t), K, N) is an eq~ilTb,~u,7~ ,.allocation for 
F., then 
u(c(t)) - n(t)m < ~(t)[u(~q(t)) - m] + (1 - ~(t))u(E2(t)), 
• "'" ", with stria inequality ifn(t) is not constant for all t. 
Proof.  Define 
~p= foln*(t)dt  and  ~-- folC*(t)dt. 
Define an allocation for E  as follows: 
cl(t)ffic2(t )-~,  all t, 
~(t) =~,  allt, 
kl(t ) = k2(t ) = 1,  all t, 
K  =  K*,  N  =  N*. 
This allocation is clearly feasible, and by definition of an equilibrium for E 
u(c*(t)) -  n*(t)m = fol(U(C*(t)) -  n*(t)m)dt 12  R. Rogerson, lndivisib!c labor, lotteries and eqviliL.r~m 
where the inequality follows from Jensen's ineq~:ality and is strict if c(t) is not 
constant. Note that the right-handside is simply the uti~ty resulting from one 
particular  feasible allocation in  E.  By Proposition  1,  the equilibrium  for 
must result in utility at least ties large.  ! 
5.  Stochastic em'ironments and comlmtation 
The previous analysis continues to hold for stochastic environments.  Sup- 
pose that there is a random variable s  taking values in a finite subset S of R N. 
Let s: index the realizations of s  and Pi be t~e probability that s = s r  In state 
i assume that preferences are given by 
u(c, ~i) -  ~(~,)n, 
and technology is given by 
f(K, N, si), 
where these functions are assumed to have the same properties as before for 
each  value  of  s r  If lott~i~c~ are  intreduced  :~en  optimal  allocations  a~'~d 
equi~[biium allocations are given by: 
max Ep,( u( c,, s,) -  m( s,)ep,), 
c,. e~,  i 
subject to 
O<_c~<_f(1,6.~,s,),  0__<~,_<  1. 
Note that  this is equivalent  to solv ug the following problem separately  for 
each value of i: 
max u(c,,  s,) -  m(s,),,, 
subject to 
O<ci<f(1,q~,si),  O_<~i< 1. 
This property generally applies to all static models with homogeneous agents 
in convex environments but will not held for the case of ;ndivisible labor in 
the absence of lotteries. 
To  see  tiffs  assume  that  S  contains  two  elements.  Computing  separate 
•  J  i  i  i  is  equilibria  for the two realizations  produces vectors ~  cw, cn, ~ ), where  c,~ 
consumption  for  individuals  who  work  in  state  i,  c~  is  consumption  for 
individuals who don't work in state i, and ~i is the fraction of individuals who R. Rogerson, 7adivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrizm~  13 
work in state i. In equilibrium it must be that 
./i  u(cw, s,) -  m(s,)n  = u(d., s~). 
Take two individuals, one who works in state 1 but not state 2 and one who 
works in state  2 but not m  state  I. (~'here  is always an equi~brium of this 
form.) These  two  individuals  will  have uneven consvmption streams  across 
states of nature. In state 1 the first individual consumes relatively more and in 
state  2  the  second  individual  consumes  relatively  more.  Because  utility  is 
concave in consumption these individuals  can become better off by trading 
claims for state i consumption. Hence the above cannot be an equilibrium. If 
there are M  states of nature,  this implies  that there are 2M markets which 
need to be operated, one each for labor and output in each state. And because 
of the discrete choice in labor supply the aggregate demands will generally be 
correspondence, not functions. It appears that even simple stochastic versions 
of the indivisible labor economy will be excessively demanding computation- 
ally in the absence of lotteries. 
This is not to imply that models which are ~¢asier to compute are imhherently 
better.  Rather,  the point being made is that  the preceding analysis suggest,: 
that our understanding of non-convexities will be facilitated by assumptions 
like  this  that  facilitate  computation  even_ ff ,,1,;m~t~!y  a  more  re~ned  or 
sophisticated notion of equilibrium is to be adopted for non-convex envia'on- 
merits. 
6.  Implications for aggregate fluctuations 
A  recurring problem in attempt~ to produce equilibrium models of aggre- 
gate  fluctuations  has  been  the  inability  of  these  models  to  account  for 
observed  relative  magnitudes of fluctuations  in_  total  labor supply and  real 
wages.  [For  example,  see  Altonji  and  Ashenfeiter  (1980),  Kydland  and 
Prescott (1982).]  In particular,  the estimates of the elasticity of labor supply 
found  using  micro  data  are  much  smaller  than  that  required  to reconcile 
aggregate fluctuations with equilibrium theory. T~s paper demonstrates that 
non-convexities may be zA substantial interest for this problem. 
Consider the alternative specification of preferences for E: 
u(c)-v(n),  c>__O,  ne{1,O},  v(O)=O. 
From problem (P-3) we have the result that if labor is indivisible this economy 
behaves as though there is a single agent with preferences given by 
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Hence there is a  discrepancy between the true preferences of agents and the 
preferences of the hypothetical representative consumer genera'tin  s  aggregate 
fluctuations.  In particular,  the  second  of these has preferences linear  in  n, 
indicating a higher dasticity of labor supply. 
Hansen  (1985)  has  shown  that  this  feature  has  implications  .~hieh  are 
empirically relevant. Whereas many other individuals have found that move- 
ments in aggregate hours are too small relative to movements in reai wages of 
productivity, Hansen's indivisible labor economy delivers too much mevemmt 
in aggregate hours relative to real wages and productivity. It is important to 
know  that  the  results  of  this  paper  do  net  depend  critically  upon  the 
assumption  of  identical  agents.  It  may  be  thought  that  having  all  agents 
simultaneously  being indifferent  between working  and  not  working is what 
causes the large response in employment relative to productivity. A paranietric 
example is offered to illustrate that heterogeneity need not affect the results of 
this  paper.  The important  feature of the example is  that each  ag¢ut  has  a 
different  reservation  wage.  Consider  the  following  specification:  there  is  a 
continuum  of agents with total mass equal to one.  Each agent has a  utility 
function of the form 
C a -  rllil ~, 
where  C  is consumption,  1 is labor supply, G < a < 1,  /] > 1,  and  m~ is an 
individual specific parameter. "Hte val~:es of m  are uniformly distributed on an 
interval [m, ~]. If the wa~e ra-,~ is W  and labor is divisible, then individual 
labor supply is given by 
W a • et 11/#-a 
l,=~  mi fl  ]  . 
Integrating over [m, ~] to obtain aggregate labor supply gives 
where 
=  !  -  (1/#-  ~). 
In logs this gives 
Ot 
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If it is assumed that labor is indivisible and agents trade lotteries as outlined in 
section 4, then the labor supply of individual i  is given by 
=( w°alv~-~ 
¢'i  ~--~  l  " 
Integrating gives 
~m-m  I' 
where 
1 
y=  ~  +  1. 
I--~ 
In logs this gives 
Ol 
!n ~ =  In W + constant. 
1--a 
As ca~ be seen by comparison of these two expressions, the case where labor 
supply is indivisible pro~u,~:s ~ s~opr~  which is larger. In fact, in this example 
the heterogeneity has no impact on foe elasticity of labor supply. Note that the 
elasticity in  the indivisible case is found by setting fl equal  to one in  the 
corresponding expression for the divis:~ble labor case. Hence, the same result 
concernirtg linearity holds in this case. 
Care  should be taken not to ndsinterpret this result. It is derived in the 
context of a  static deterministic environment. Computing equiiibrium a~Ioca- 
tions for dynamic st~hasfic environments (like that of Hansen) is ultimately 
the object of interest, but is too difficult a task to be undertaken here for the 
case of heterogeneous consumer~,. 
If there were no lotteries in 1.he ezonomy with indivisible labor, men each 
agent simply decides whether or not to work. Because the m~'s differ across 
agents, this decision will differ across agents. In partK ular, an agent supplies 
labor if W ~ -  m~ > 0 and doesn't supply labor if W* -  m~ < 0. When equality 
holds  the  individual is  indifferent. In  this  economy  each  individual has  a 
different reservation wage w!dch causes them to enter the market, given by 
_  _a/~  Note that in the e~onomy with lotteries individuals always have the  Wi--mi  . 
choice of ~  =  1 or ~--0,  so implicitly it follows that lotteries are improving 
welfare. 16  R. Rogerson, Indivisible Ichor, lotteries ~nd equilibrium 
7.  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  analyzed  the problem  of indfiAsible labor  in  an  economy 
with identical individuals. 
The main conclusion of this paper is that nc n-convexities at the individual 
level may have important aggregate effects even if there are a large number of 
individuals.  In  the  case  studied  here,  the  aggregate  economy  behaves  as  if 
there were no non-convexities but all individuals have preferences which are 
linear in leisure even though  no individual in the economy has  such  prefer- 
ences. 
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